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Abstract

Frameworks for IT evaluation have been extensively discussed in the past. Until recently,
research had concentrated on advancing classic approaches such as monetary cost/benefit
considerations or strategic management matrices, but that constriction to known methods has
considerably softened. More researchers now use economic models in IT evaluation. Their
contributions open exciting new perspectives but unfortunately the models put forward
cannot reach wide in practice as they are highly formalized. Addressing the use of economic
theory in IS research, this paper attempts to fully operationalize an economic theory into a
framework apt for management. Exemplarily, in a “research method case study”, we
operationalize Principal-Agent theory for a specific organizational setting. The particular
situation we develop the framework for is collective investment into Information Technology
(such as collaborative Supply Chain Management systems or collective reservation systems
for airline networks). The four steps we conduct in our operationalization are translation,
scenario building, structured qualitative analysis and aggregation. Along with presenting the
complete operationalization process, the final framework demonstrates that a complex
Principal-Agent problem can be transcribed into an easy to use IS management framework.
Keywords: IT evaluation, methodology, new institutional economics, Principal-Agent theory,
management framework

1. Introduction: towards an economic approach to IT evaluation
Ways of measuring the business value of information systems have been hotly debated in IS
research ever since the discipline was founded (Banker and Kaufmann 2004). In general, two
streams of evaluation methods can be identified. One uses financial measures such as
anticipated costs and benefits, the other tries to grasp strategic implications of IS. Evaluation
frameworks have been refined extensively in the past years; other approaches try to bring
relevant perspectives together (see, for example, Melville et al. 2004). Economic theory has
long found its way into IT evaluation (e.g. Gold 1964, Kriebel and Raviv 1980 or Thatcher
and Pingry 2004, Kumar 2004, Han et al. 2004), but as these models are highly formalized,
their application in management is made difficult if not impossible.
In the course of researching IT evaluation methods for a particular setting (collective IT
investments), we find that not a refinement of existing management tools but a novel one
based on economic theory is needed. To Williamson (1985, p. 121-122), drawing on an
economic analysis of the Japanese way of cooperating, opportunism is the major inhibitor for
investing collectively. So if no collective governance structures exist which can handle
opportunistic behaviour (such as in cooperations between independent partners which can be
found e.g. in supply chains or the airline industry), the risk for opportunism intrinsic to
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investment options must be measured. As Principal-Agent (PA) theory is primarily concerned
with the analysis of contracting parties behaving opportunistically, we choose to
operationalize this part of the new institutional economics. In essence, we derive a
management framework for comparing the relative advantageousness of collective
investment scenarios in regard to the risk for opportunism associated to them.
This paper can be regarded as an exploratory methodological case study. Exploratory case
studies constitute a prelude to other methods of social science research and are generally
conducted when a phenomenon requires a first access. “Such a phenomenon may be a project
or program in an evaluation study” (Yin 2003, p. 4). In this paper, the project/phenomenon is
our research effort in the field of operationalizing economic theory for IS research. So what is
new is that we do not classically describe a practical business phenomenon but a practical
research case. The paper’s primary contribution is to demonstrate a practical example of
economic theory operationalization in IS research. Hence, the results of the case itself are
not as important as the case’s structured description which follows our research process.
The paper’s structure reflects this objective. Besides supplying the reader with background on
the investigation’s setting (cooperations between independent companies, also known as
inter-firm networks) and relevant elements of the investigation’s model (Principal-Agent
theory), section 2 draws analogies to other attempts at operationalizing economic theory
(investigation method). Section 3 is arranged along the lines of our own operationalization
efforts: translation, scenario building, structured qualitative analysis and aggregation. In
addition to stating shortcomings of our operationalization attempt, section 4 provides a short
summary and a brief outlook.

2. Relevant Background
2.1. Investigation setting: collective IT investments in inter-firm networks
Cooperations between companies exist in manifold varieties such as joint ventures, strategic
alliances and inter-firm networks. Definitions of and classification criteria for these different
types of cooperations are numerous, but, in general, most classifications include dimensions
such as financial/legal independence of the participating partners, resource catenation,
cooperation time/scope and size.
Inter-firm networks represent a type of cooperation which emphasizes the independence of
the participants (Miles and Snow 1986, Davidow and Malone 1992, Haecki and Lighton
2001, Veil and Hess 2002, Sturgeon 2002; NB: in our understanding virtual organizations
form a subset of inter-firm networks). In respect to the typical classification criteria stated
above, inter-firm networks are special as
(1) the partners are financially and legally independent and they do not primarily pool
their resources (unlike setting up a joint venture where partners incorporate resources
into a new firm),
(2) inter-firm networks are not limited in cooperation time and cooperation scope (unlike
strategic alliances where cooperation is limited to a specific transactional aspect, e.g.
5 year preferred supplier relationships),
(3) every time an order arrives which is to be dealt with within the network, the
configuration of the participating partners might change (see figure 1) and
(4) the number of participants in inter-firm networks can easily exceed 10 partners.
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Figure 1: Order-based partner configuration (Veil and Hess 2002, p. 274)
An example of an international inter-firm network is the airline network Star Alliance. Here,
15 financially and legally independent national carriers align their operations to jointly
provide services to end customers. For example, passengers can travel across the entire Star
Alliance Network using one single e-ticket. This was made possible by linking the individual
carriers’ IT systems via Star Alliance’s collective IT infrastructure, StarNet. Benefits include
reduced complexity, improved customer service and lower costs for member carriers.
As indicated in the Star Alliance example collective IT infrastructures, which form the basis
of interorganizational systems (IOS), will typically not be set up in Greenfield projects.
Rather, the individual partners’ systems will be integrated in one form or another as Eom
(2005, p. 4) defines: “An interorganizational system is an information and management
system that transcendents organizational boundaries via electronic linkages.” Methods and
standards for integrating IT systems are hotly debated in practice and research and include
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), eXtended Markup Language (XML), decentralized
Enterprise Application Integration (EAI), hub-and-spoke EAI, web services and central
databases. Within these technologies and methods, two architectural approaches can be
differentiated: centralization and decentralization. For instance, hub-and-spoke EAI (a
middleware including adaptors, transformation services and process management tools) and
collective databases represent centralized architectures while changing to a common standard
counts towards the other option. Still, they all constitute investments into
relationship-specific IT. The IT options’ common characteristic is that they all serve as a
common infrastructure set between enterprise-wide and public infrastructures (for a
categorization see Weill et al. 2002).
2.2. Investigation model: Principal-Agent theory
Principal-Agent (PA) theory is part of the new institutional economics and has several early
contributors including Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976). A PA relationship is defined “as a contract under which one or more
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority” (Jensen and Meckling
1976, p. 308). Today, in essence, PA theory deals with problems which arise whenever the
principal cannot perfectly and costlessly assess the agent’s action and information (“which is
almost always the case”, Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985, p. 2) and the agent derives scope for
opportunistic behavior from this information asymmetry.
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In the tradition of new institutional economics, PA theory assumes bounded rationality and
individual utility maximization. The information asymmetry ( bounded rationality)
between principal and agent leads to a discretionary scope for autonomous and therefore
opportunistic behavior on the agent’s side ( utility maximization). Such situations typically
exist in buyer-supplier, owner-manager and venture capitalist-investee but also in
landlord-tenant or doctor-patient relationships (Wigand et al. 1997). As PA is a basic
economic theory, it can explicitly be applied to any social situation (Ross 1973). Naturally,
one person can find himself in numerous PA relationships, acting as principal in one, as agent
in another context or even as principal and agent in reciprocal relationships (Pratt and
Zeckhauser 1985).
When trying to reduce the uncertainties the information asymmetry poses, principals incur
monitoring expenditures while agents have to commit resources to bonding. In addition,
certain transactions do not take place which would have been beneficial to overall welfare
(residual loss). These three items add up to Agency-costs which differ among organizational
arrangements (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
In detail, three problems emerge from the underlying information asymmetry: (1) hidden
action (2) hidden intention and (3) hidden characteristics (Wigand et al.1997).
(1) After the contract has been signed the principal cannot observe or judge the agent’s
efforts (hidden action) and the agent can maximize his utility at the expense of the
principal. This phenomenon is known also known as “moral hazard”.
(2) In addition, the post-contractual intentions of the agent remain hidden. As the
principal ex-ante advances resources (constituting sunk costs) to enter a specific
relationship, he is then dependent upon the agent. Ex-post, he can observe the agent’s
actions but cannot change them. The resulting scope for opportunistically exploiting
this dependency is categorized as “hold up”.
(3) Hidden characteristics are based on the assumption that the principal cannot
accurately judge the quality of the agent’s offer before the contract is signed. The key
problem with hidden characteristics is not primarily opportunistic behavior itself but
the information asymmetry’s final consequence: it results in adverse selection, where
unfavorable agents chosen which will, in extreme cases, lead to the closing of
markets. By now, numerous tested strategies for reducing pre-contractual information
asymmetries exist. Still, the problem’s focus is not on opportunism itself. Therefore
hidden characteristics will not be pursued further in this analysis.
In general, Principal-Agent theory can be used to explain (positive analysis) or to design
(normative analysis) such relationships. In normative analyses, recommendations are put
forward as to which institutional arrangement is to be chosen (depending on agency-costs). In
our case, a positive analysis is conducted as institutional arrangements seem to be very hard
to establish (see introduction / see also Casciaro 2003 or Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001) and
hence the degree of opportunistic scope of different options is to be measured.
2.3. Investigation method: operationalizing economic theory
To our knowledge, evaluation frameworks for measuring the risk for opportunism associated
to a specific investment have not yet been developed. In general, the aim of economic
investigations is relative, not absolute comparison (Williamson 1991). But while economic
comparisons are typically used with the purpose of (formally) explaining the dynamics of
reality (in our case: governance of, structure of and investment behaviour in inter-firm
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networks / see Han et al. 2004, Beckman et al. 2004, Solf 2004, Casciaro, 2004, Wohlgemuth
and Hess 2003 for recent examples), our study sets out to develop a management framework
for collective investments.
Numerous Principal-Agent analysis were conducted for real life cases (see Reid 1977, Rubin
1978, Block and MacMillan 1993, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995 or Casamatta 2003 on
complex PA-analysis examples). Still, they have not been operationalized to a management
framework. Generally, research has rather attended to operationalizing transaction cost
theory. In this respect, we scanned transaction cost attempts in order to obtain a general idea
for approaching the operationalization of PA theory. For our case, we tried to focus on works
set in an atmosphere where our object of analysis, the risk for opportunism, is considered as a
major influence on decision making: IT sourcing. Our analysis harvested three approaches:
(1) quantifying transaction costs in order to use the figures in cost accounting (e.g. Albach
1988), (2) quantifying the level of perceived transaction cost (e.g. Ang and Straub 1998) and
(3) breaking down transaction cost into qualitatively assessable variables (e.g. Dibbern et al.
2003 who explain the correlation between transaction and production cost in outsourcing by
discerning qualitative context variables such as specific process knowledge, trust and location
specificity).
Option (1) has been widely discussed, but contradicts the idea of relative economic
comparison and has not yielded substantial results so far (Burr 2003). While the results of
option (2) would foster the individual reflection of the personal decision making situation of a
cooperation partner, option (3) additionally yields a basis for discussion and negotiation
within the inter-firm network, as the composition of the risk levels is transparently developed
in a structured manner. Therefore, option 3 will be pursued for operationalizing PA theory in
our case.

3. Operationalization case study
As discussed in section 2.3, breaking down the decision making situation at hand into
qualitatively assessable variables seems to be the most promising approach for categorical
operationalization in our setting. Following scientific method, we have to distinguish between
exogenous (independent) and endogenous (dependent) variables. In our case, the endogenous
variable (the one we wish to measure for different types of collective IT investment) is the
risk level as induced by hidden action and hidden intention respectively. The independent
variables make up types of collective IT investments.
While the endogenous variable is clear, it is imperative to define adequate independent
variables. Hence we first translate the setting of investing collectively into PA-theory: who
can – abstracted away from a real case – take on the roles of Principal and Agent? Then, we
build scenarios which are made up of all realistically possible combinations of PA-roles and
participants in the real world. These scenarios constitute aggregations of independent
variables. Then we analyse all information asymmetries ( qualitatively assessable
dependent variables) in those scenarios and record the results in a structured, comparable
manner. Finally, we aggregate these results to arrive at a comprehensive risk assessment
framework. Figure 2 summarizes this process.
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Translation
Who is Principal, who is Agent?
What is the Agent’s task?

Scenario building
Which different types of collective IT investment are possible?

Structured qualitative analysis
Analyzing the relevant risks in all scenarios.

Result aggregation
Pulling the individual risk analyses together.

Figure 2: Operationalization process
3.1. Translation
As indicated in section 2.2, Principal-Agent relations can be quite complex as they might
encompass multiple agents and multiple principals and even be reciprocal (Grossmann and
Hart 1983, Pratt and Zeckhauser, Arrow 1985, Wigand et al. 1997). Therefore, when
analysing relationships in terms of Principal-Agent theory, it is imperative that all relevant
roles of the participating players are clearly stated from the beginning. In order to supply a
starting point for the following positive analysis and a quick-reference for readers, this
section will first give an overview of the relevant roles.
In the case of collective IT investment, three roles can be identified. One company might take
on several roles; one role can be taken on by many companies.
•

Beneficiary: Any network member who links up to the collective IS in order to
benefit from using it. Beneficiaries do not necessarily have to invest into the
collective IS.

•

Investor: Any network member who actively designs and pays for setting up and
running the system and benefits from using it himself and/or others using it. Investors
hold most property rights to the system (system owners). If there are multiple
investors, the total cost of the system is shared; if only one partner invests, he carries
the total cost himself.

•

Supplier: The institution which sets up and runs the system. Depending on the
architecture/sourcing option chosen, suppliers can either be all investors, one/a small
group of investors or an external supplier.

Relevant players can be clearly identified in all collective IT investments, an interesting
example being the papiNet integration project. papiNet set out as a global transaction
standard initiative and can now be regarded as an inter-firm network in our terminology (due
to flexible production configuration, legal and financial independence of the partners, high
number of partners and unlimited cooperation scope; see section 2.1). In June 2001, all major
papiNet partners (a group of 80 print-media companies including publishers, printing shops,
logistics companies and paper manufacturers) introduced ebXML-based communication
software: Ponton X/P. This software (legacy system adaptors + messenger) is based on
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open-source products, but had to be customized to match industry processes. Development
costs were completely covered by the paper manufactures, whilst customization itself was
outsourced to Ponton Consulting. Cleary, all network members who introduce this
decentralized collective information system gain benefits from it in terms of process and
resource economies (beneficiaries). At first, the paper manufacturers designed and paid the
system (investors) but also benefit from the linking up to it (beneficiaries). Ponton
Consulting, which developed the system, was the supplier of the collective IS at this stage of
the project.
Figure 3 depicts an overview of the Principal-Agent relationships players can find themselves
in. While the problems within these relations will be discussed in more detail later, this first
classification is needed for describing important scenarios.

Principal -Agent relationship

1

2

Agent

Principal

Principal

Agent

Beneficiary
has mandate
to use the IOS

Investor has
mandate to
design the IOS

3
Beneficiary

Principal

Investor

Agent

Supplier

Role

Supplier has
mandate to
run the IOS

Figure 3: Generic Principal-Agent map for collective IS investment (Hirnle 2005, p. 10)
•

PA-relationship 1: A collective IS generates value only if enough network partners
(beneficiaries) participate. So, once the investors have committed their resources to
the investment (and have hence incurred sunk costs), they are dependent on the other
network members to take part in the collective IS. If all investors are also
beneficiaries, all network members are principals and agents to each other in this
respect.

•

PA-relationship 2: At the same time, in order to secure participation of enough
beneficiaries, the investor must build an IS the partners agree with. In other words, the
investor is commissioned to design and build an IOS on behalf of the participating
partners. If all beneficiaries are also investors, all network members are principals and
agents to each other in this respect.

•

PA-relationship 3: The investor-supplier relationship is PA-classic. The investors
select a supplier (network partner or external institution) to set up and run the
collective IS. During the selection phase, investors incur transaction costs. Once the
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supplier (agent) is selected, the investors (principals) pay the supplier for setting up
and running the IS.
3.2. Scenario building
The PA-relationships modelled here bear great potential for opportunistic behaviour.
However, the degree of discretionary scope for opportunistic action varies depending on how
the investment atmosphere is shaped. The optimal shape of that atmosphere for a company
depends on its individual position within the network, or, in other words, the role it takes on
(Baker et al. 2002). When considering information asymmetries between the parties, the
question is to what extent the participants take on all roles or to what extent the roles are
divided amongst individual parties. The differentiating criterion between beneficiary and
investor is optional investing (beneficiaries can, but do not necessarily have to invest). If
suppliers are external to the network, they are separate entities with own information levels.
If suppliers are internal, roles are combined. Hence, four possible scenarios can be identified
(graphically depicted in Figure 4) which differ by the amount of partners who incur
expenditures for designing, setting up and running the IOS (all partners or only a fraction of
the partners) and how the IOS is sourced.

All partners*

Scenario 1:
self-reliant
cooperation

Scenario 2:
balanced
cooperation

Scenario 3:
trust-based
cooperation

Scenario 4:
arm‘s lenght
cooperation

Network
member

External
institution

Investor
(who designs and
pays for the
collective IS?)
A fraction of
the partners*

Supplier
(of collective IS)
* partners who use the
IOS constitute beneficiaries

Figure 4: Principal-Agent scenarios in collective IS investment (Hirnle 2005, p. 12)
Certainly, a PA-relationship also exists between beneficiaries and suppliers. However, we
chose to refrain from a detailed analysis of this relationship as the relationship between
investing beneficiaries and suppliers is already modelled in PA-relationship 3 and we believe
that a central difference between scenarios 2 and 4 lies in cutting off non-investing
beneficiaries from suppliers.
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3.3. Structured qualitative analysis
In this section, the two potential information asymmetries (hidden action, hidden intention)
ought to be discussed in regard to the three Principal-Agent relationships in all four scenarios,
the central measure being the risk for opportunism. As this paper’s objective is to
demonstrate the process of operationalization, merely one sample scenario will be discussed
here. We choose to go into investment scenario 2 (balanced cooperation) as this scenario
represents the most advantageous approach in comparison to the other scenarios. It has to be
said that when displaying one scenario only, the transparency of the risk ratings is diminished
as the reader cannot place the derivation of the rating into relation to the other scenarios’
discussions. Still, the operationalization step “structured qualitative analysis” is made clear. A
detailed analysis of all scenarios can be found in Hirnle (2005).
Scenario classification
In the balanced cooperation scenario, all network members ex-ante agree to bear their share
of the costs of the collective IS (unlike scenarios 3 & 4). All beneficiaries are also investors.
Unlike scenario 1, however, the supplier is a company external to the network. In other
words, the collective IS is sourced “in-network” in scenario 1 and is now being “outsourced”
in scenario 2. One central difference for our analysis is that external providers allow
usage-based fees (such as application service providers - ASPs). An example for this scenario
would be a collaborative supply chain management system which is run by a third party
vendor.
Risk 1: Hidden action/moral hazard
Relationship 1: Grave hidden action information asymmetries exist in this investor (principal)
- beneficiary (agent) relationship. The central moral hazard feature here is known as free
riding, was first focused by Holmstrom (1982) and has been attributed to inter-firm networks
by Rokkan and Buvik (2003). In our context, free riding denotes a situation where network
members enjoy the benefits of the common good (here: IOS usage rights) without having to
bear the full costs: either an investor understates his benefit derived from the IOS and pays
less or the ex-ante investor changes his mind and refuses to pay at all. The free riding partner
can do so as a) partners cannot adequately judge the utility to the free rider and hence cannot
know that he is free riding and b) the utility of the IOS depends on all partners participating,
and hence the network members will not always exclude the free rider from using it.
However, investors will only invest if they expect an individual positive return and that return
is in a fair relation to the returns the other investors receive (Wohlgemuth and Hess 2003).
Fundamentally, investors find themselves in catch 22: while they are basically willing to pay
for a collective service, they could potentially have higher returns if they engaged in free
riding.
Free riding is particularly important topic in this scenario and can, in extreme cases, lead to
an inadequate IOS or even inhibit its installation. When entering an outsourcing relationship,
both the provider and the investor incur information and communication costs during the
initiation, negotiation, settlement, adaptation and control of the exchange (commonly known
as transaction costs, Williamson 1975). The provider will add his transaction costs to the
price he charges. The investors have to add their transaction costs to their net expenditure for
the IOS. When an ex-ante investor deflects and chooses to free ride, he can examine the
negotiated contracts after the process has ended. If he favors the contract, he can realise it
without incurring as high transaction costs. If he considers the conditions to be inappropriate,
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he can either not introduce the IOS at all or negotiate his own contract. He defers his decision
to participate into the future without taking extra risks. The reduced transaction costs and
his real option to defer the investment both constitute potential extra utility to the agent. In
addition, typical outsourced IT is highly standardised. As the outsourcing contracts
themselves reflect this feature, network partners can more easily deflect from the group of
original investors. Hence, sourcing an IOS externally when all beneficiaries ex-ante agree to
be investors even increases the danger of free riding due to standardised contracts.
Therefore, the risk for opportunistic behaviour due to moral hazard is considered to be
very high.
Relationship 2: As all beneficiaries invest and hence take part in system/outsourcing contract
design, information asymmetries can be ruled out. When an ex-ante investor chooses to free
ride and become a beneficiary only, he can still be quite sure to obtain access to an
appropriate IOS due to the high degree of standardization. The same goes for the remaining
investors, if, of course, enough network partners participate in the design. Hence, only a low
risk can be identified.
Relationship 3: If an external entity sets up and runs the IOS, a hidden action information
asymmetry arises between the investors and the supplier. While the supplier’s performance
can be measured and managed through Service-Level-Agreements, the inter-firm network
looses control over how the IOS is run (e.g. what happens to externally saved data). Overall,
however, as external suppliers typically handle several clients, all these clients undertake
monitoring to some extent. So the more standardized and the more centralized an
outsourced IOS is, the lower monitoring costs to the individual partners are. Therefore,
moral hazard is unlikely which leads to a low risk for opportunistic behavior.
Risk 2: Hidden intention/hold up
Relationship 1: When all beneficiaries invest, no hold up problems occur. Only if moral
hazard sets in (in the shape of free riding), investors will have sunk costs and will then be
dependent on the participants. Unlike scenario 1, where an internal supplier has to shoulder
the IT investment sum, the external supplier carries the biggest part of the original investment
in this scenario. The sunk costs investors (inter-firm network partners) incur are transaction
costs which are far lower than the costs of the original IT investment. While the risk by itself
is medium, the relatively low sunk costs the investors incur lead to a low level of risk in this
relationship.
Relationship 2: No risk can be identified when all beneficiaries invest. In free riding
situations, the reduced functionality due to free riders not taking part in the design process of
the IOS can be considered minimal. That is, of course, if enough partners do actively invest.
In all, the risk is very low.
Relationship 3: The key factor determining hold up problems in investor-supplier
relationships is transaction specificity. Typically, inter-firm network IT is considered to by
highly specific (e.g. common standards, common databases, etc.). From an ex-ante hidden
intention perspective, however, this is not necessarily the case: as there can be an intense
market-based competition for the contract, the economic specificity of the transaction is
relatively low. Once the supplier is chosen, however, a fundamental transformation occurs
(Williamson 1985): with the supplier building up idiosyncratic knowledge about the network
he gains advantages over competitors which they cannot catch up. This way, an ex-ante
starting position with low specificity can, over time, lead to a monopoly-like exchange
situation.
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In scenario 1 (all partners invest, IOS is sourced in-network) hold up is very strong as the
system’s specificity helps the internal supplier to hide his intentions to a very high degree.
When sourcing externally, however, specificity is likely to be reduced for two reasons: a)
investors have an interest in standardized systems as they want to be able to source the IOS
from another supplier and hence reduce the risk for fundamental transformation and b)
suppliers have an interest in standardized systems as they want to be able to sell the same
resource to other customers. Even if suppliers do not agree to/cannot offer a standardized
system, hold up is low due to reputation effects. As a supplier’s key business is IT provision,
reputation loss would directly affect his business. In other words, the supplier incurs
signaling costs by not behaving opportunistically and, this way, builds up his reputation. So
even when taking into consideration that the externally sourced system can have different
levels of specificity, the risk for hold up is regarded to be rather low.
Summary of scenario 2
Relative to scenario 1 (all beneficiaries invest, IOS is sourced in-network), the risk for
opportunistic behavior is notably reduced. This is particularly true for a reduced risk for sunk
costs and a lower probability of opportunistic behavior on the supplier’s side. However, the
potential free riding of ex-ante investors is facilitated. Table 1 summarizes the evaluation
carried out.

Relationship
1
Principal: Investor
Agent: Beneficiary
2
Principal: Beneficiary
Agent: Investor
3
Principal: Investor
Agent: Supplier

Risk for opportunistic behavior due to

Risk summary

Hidden action

Hidden intention

High

Low



Low

Low



Low

Low



Table 1: Summary of analysis for scenario 2
(Reading example: in relationship 2 of this scenario,
the principals (beneficiaries) face an overall low risk for opportunism)
3.4. Aggregation
In the original study, all scenarios are discussed in the same structured manner and the
discussions’ results are all recorded in a risk summary table for the individual relationships.
The tables now have to be restructured to reflect management structures aggregated to reduce
complexity. In short: while the discussions lead to scenario summaries, a management
framework must take on a stakeholder-based view. The risk levels assessments have to be
carried over into risk assessment frameworks for investors and beneficiaries respectively.
Restructuring the tables to reflect the stakeholder structure leads to the final risk assessment
framework which is depicted in Figure 5.
The risk levels shown can easily be reconstructed from the summary of analysis for scenario
2 (table 1). For example, when all partners invest and the IOS is outsourced (scenario 2), the
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investors’ risk is aggregated to . This rating is averaged from to the investors’ opportunism
risks for relationship 1 () and relationship 3 ().

*
Opportunism
Opportunism risk
risklevels
levelsforforbeneficiaries
investors

All partners

!

!

!

!

!

A fraction
A fraction
of the partners of the partners

!

!

!

!

!

All partners

Investor

Investor

Insourcing
(decentralized IOS
architecture)

Insourcing

Insourcing
Outsourcing
(centralized IOS

architecture)
Sourcing
option

Outsourcing

*

Sourcing option

* Reading example: when only

a fraction of the partners can be counted towards the investors and outsourcing is chosen as the IOS
option , investors face a relatively low risk for opportunism whereas b
eneficiaries are confronted with a high risk level.

sourcing

Figure 5: Risk assessment framework (Hirnle 2005, p. 24)
The framework can easily be put to practice (for an example see Hirnle 2005). After
gathering a few basic facts on the setting (e.g. all network members/a fraction of the network
members invest), every company must become clear about which position they take on (am I
an investor or a beneficiary only?). With those easily accessible facts, any IOS investment
can be positioned within the risk assessment framework and the risk level can be read off.
Once the risk levels for the individual companies are identified, they can be discussed within
the network and, if risk is unequally distributed, a different IOS option could be chosen.
Naturally, the outcome of such discussions depends on factors such as strategies, negotiating
power and risk aversions of the participants involved. Nevertheless, the framework can be
useful for creating transparency in collective investments. So even if one partner insisted on
keeping his opportunistic scope for action, his intentions would become clearer before the
IOS was introduced which also constitutes a reduction of information asymmetries.

694

4. Summary, limitations and outlook
This paper set out to demonstrate the operationalization of an economic theory for use in IS
management. First, we quickly introduced the investigation’s setting (collective IT
investment in inter-firm networks), model (Principal-Agent theory) and method
(operationalization of economic theory). In section 3, our exemplary investigation was
structured along four steps: translation, scenario building, structured qualitative analysis and
aggregation. Our methodological case concluded with the application of the newly developed
framework.
Several points of critique must find a mention. First and foremost, a qualitative analysis lacks
the apparent rigor of a formal economic model. Second, by aggregating risk levels,
complexity might be reduced to strongly. Third, the framework is rather a basis for
negotiation that a strict evaluation instrument in the sense of a net present value calculation.
However, we believe that the framework represents a realistic management approach to the
problem.
In all, the paper presented an exploratory, methodological case study of economic theory
operationalization for Information Systems research. In next steps, it would be interesting to
either conduct more operationalization case studies with the structure presented here (using
other theories and others settings) or with different approaches. In the future, a standardised
and process model, harmonised amongst the researchers in the community, would be very
helpful for taking advantage of the economic theories’ power in IS management.
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